Range Effects and Lottery Pricing by Blavatskyy, Pavlo R & Köhler, Wolfgang R
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 323 
Range Effects and Lottery Pricing 
Pavlo R. Blavatskyy and Wolfgang R. Köhler 
April 2008  
 
 
Range Effects and Lottery Pricing* 
Pavlo R. Blavatskyy† and Wolfgang R. Köhler‡ 
April 2008 
Abstract 
 
A standard method to elicit certainty equivalents is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
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Range Effects and Lottery Pricing 
A standard method to elicit the certainty equivalent of a risky lottery is the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure proposed by Becker et al. (1964). Under 
the BDM procedure, individuals are asked to state their minimum selling price for a 
risky lottery. The experimenter then draws a random number between the lowest and the 
highest outcome of the lottery. If the price that the individual states is lower than or 
equal to the drawn number, she receives the drawn number as her payoff. Otherwise she 
has to play the risky lottery. If preferences satisfy the independence axiom, decisions 
are not affected by errors, and the reduction-of-compound-lotteries axiom holds, then 
the BDM procedure elicits the correct certainty equivalent of the lottery. 
It is well-known that the BDM procedure does not necessarily provide the correct 
incentives to reveal the certainty equivalent if preferences violate the independence 
axiom and individuals take the compound lotteries into account, which they face in a 
BDM-task (e.g., Karni and Safra, 1987). However, if subjects do not consider compound 
lotteries, the BDM procedure elicits the true certainty equivalents even if the underlying 
preferences can not be represented by an expected utility functional. Starmer and 
Sugden (1991) were the first to provide convincing experimental evidence that in binary 
choice tasks subjects evaluate risky lotteries in isolation and that they ignore the 
compound lotteries that are generated by the random lottery incentive scheme. 
In the BDM-procedure, subjects can usually state any price (or at least any price 
between the lowest and the highest outcome of the lottery). However, in many pricing 
decisions exist some upper or lower limits on the possible prices. These limits can be 
explicit (e.g., the reservation price or the current bid in an auction) or implicit (e.g. the 
price of the item under consideration at a different firm or the budget constraint). 
There exists a large literature on range effects that documents how limits affect 
prices. To study the effects of limits on prices, we analyze pricing decisions in the 
standard BDM-task and in a modification of the standard BDM-task—the restricted 
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BDM-task. In a restricted BDM-task, subjects can only state selling prices which lie in 
an interval that is symmetric around the expected value of the lottery and which 
includes either the highest or the lowest outcome of the lottery (whichever is closer to 
the expected value). Similar to the standard BDM-procedure, the random number that is 
used to determine payoffs in the restricted BDM-task is drawn from the interval of 
feasible selling prices. Note that a price outside this interval would yield the same 
distribution of payoffs as a price that is equal to the closest bound of the interval. 
If subjects use the same procedure to price lotteries in the restricted and the 
standard BDM-task, then the elicited prices should be consistent in the following sense. 
If preferences are deterministic, a subject who states a minimum selling price in the 
standard BDM-task, which is inside the feasible interval of selling prices in the 
restricted BDM-task, should state the same price in the restricted BDM-task. Otherwise, 
the price that she states in the restricted BDM-task should be equal to the closest bound 
of the interval of feasible prices. If subjects have stochastic preferences, then the 
percentage of prices that are outside or equal to the bounds in the standard BDM-task 
should not be statistically different from the percentage of prices that are equal to the 
bound in the restricted BDM-task. 
We run an experiment to compare elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-
tasks. Our results can be summarized as follows. The repeated elicitation of minimum 
selling prices via the standard BDM procedure shows a within- (between-) subject 
consistency rate of 16.7% (40.8%). This indicates that elicited prices are quite stochastic. 
A comparison of prices that are elicited in standard and restricted BDM-tasks shows 
that subjects do not evaluate risky lotteries in isolation. Instead, elicited prices are 
strongly affected by the interval from which the subject has to choose a price and from 
which the random number is drawn. This effect depends on the characteristics of the 
lottery. In a standard BDM-task, subjects state systematically higher (lower) minimum 
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selling prices than in a restricted BDM-task if a two-outcome lottery delivers the highest 
outcome with probability lower (higher) than 0.5. 
The standard and the restricted BDM-task differ with respect to: 
-   the interval from which the random number is drawn that determines payoffs 
-   the interval (range) of feasible selling prices differs. 
Hence we analyze two possible explanations: 
1. Since the interval from which the random number is drawn differs, subjects 
face different compound lotteries even if they state the same price in the 
standard and the restricted BDM-task. If subjects take compound lotteries into 
account, selling prices can differ across tasks. 
2. Since the range of feasible prices differs, range effects can possibly explain the 
results. 
We propose a model of Stochastic Pricing that offers an intuitive explanation for 
range effects and that explains the systematic differences between prices in standard and 
restricted BDM-tasks. We consider subjects whose preferences are described by a 
random utility model. Subjects determine the minimum selling price of a lottery via a 
sequence of hypothetical binary comparisons between the lottery and different monetary 
amounts. Depending on whether the amount or the lottery is preferred, the subject 
decreases or increases the amount to which the lottery is compared. The sequence of 
comparisons stops if the preferred alternative switches. The selling price that subjects 
state is the average of the last two amounts to which the lottery has been compared. This 
model predicts range effects because subjects compare the lottery only to outcomes that 
are indeed feasible selling prices. 
Our model provides an intuitive explanation for the difference in prices across 
standard and restricted BDM-tasks and for the typical fourfold pattern of risk-attitudes 
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In a companion paper, Blavatskyy and Köhler 
(2007) test the procedural assumptions of the proposed model of stochastic pricing. 
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Blavatskyy and Köhler (2007) analyze how subjects adjust their stated minimum selling 
prices under time pressure. They show that the observed price adjustment patterns look 
exactly like the patterns that are predicted by our stochastic pricing model. 
The idea of hypothetical comparisons between the lottery and monetary amounts 
is similar to the computational model of Johnson and Busemeyer (2005). In their model, 
pricing a lottery involves a candidate search module (that determines which amount is 
compared to the lottery) and a comparison module (that specifies how the lottery is 
compared to the amount). Subjects compare a lottery with an amount via evaluating a 
sequence of hypothetical plays of the lottery. This generates a discrete Markov chain. 
Subjects declare indifference or preference for one of the alternatives if the Markov 
process crosses the respective thresholds. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes design, 
implementation and results of the experiment. Section 2 tests the predictions of different 
decision theories. Section 3 concludes. 
1 Experimental Design and Results 
1.1 Lotteries 
We used 15 risky lotteries that are shown in Table 1. All lotteries have only two 
outcomes and the lowest outcome is zero. Lotteries 1-3 are the same as in Harbaugh et 
al. (2003), except that payoffs are in Swiss Francs (CHF) and multiplied by 3.5. 
Lotteries 4-15 are the same as in lottery set I from Tversky et al. (1990), except that 
payoffs are in CHF and multiplied by 10. One CHF was approximately $0.83 or €0.61 
at the time of the experiment. 
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 L15
Outcome 1x  70 70 70 40 160 20 90 30 65 40 400 25 85 20 50
Probability 1p  0.1 0.4 0.8 0.97 0.31 0.81 0.19 0.94 0.5 0.89 0.11 0.94 0.39 0.92 0.5
Outcome 2x  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Probability 2p  0.9 0.6 0.2 0.03 0.69 0.19 0.81 0.06 0.5 0.11 0.89 0.06 0.61 0.08 0.5
Table 1 Lotteries used in the experiment (outcomes are in CHF) 
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Risky lotteries were described and subsequently played out in terms of the 
number of red and black cards in a box that contains 100 cards. If the subject drew a 
black card, she would receive zero. If she drew a red card, she would receive the highest 
outcome of the lottery. We used a bar to represent the proportion of red and black cards 
graphically on the computer screen. We used color coding to distinguish different tasks.  
  
Figure 1 Screenshots of standard and restricted BDM-tasks (translated from 
German) 
1.2 Elicitation of Minimum Selling Prices  
Subjects were asked twice to state a price for each of the 15 lotteries in Table 1. 
One price was elicited in a standard BDM-task. The other price was elicited in a 
restricted BDM-task. 
In a standard BDM-task, subjects were endowed with a lottery and they were 
asked to enter a minimum selling price for the lottery. A screenshot of the standard 
BDM-task for lottery L1 is shown on the left hand side of Figure 1. If a standard BDM-
task was selected to determine the payoff, a random number was drawn from the 
interval between zero and the highest outcome of the lottery. If the subject stated a price 
higher than the randomly drawn number, she would play the lottery. Otherwise she 
would sell the lottery and receive an amount equal to the randomly drawn number.  
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In a restricted BDM-task, subjects were endowed with a lottery and they were 
asked to enter a selling price. Subjects could only enter prices from a specified interval. 
For all lotteries we used the interval { } { }[ ]111111 ,2min,2,0max xxpxxp − , which is 
symmetric around the expected value of the lottery and includes either the lowest or the 
highest outcome. A screenshot of the restricted BDM-task for lottery L3 is shown on the 
right hand side of Figure 2. If one of the restricted BDM-tasks was selected to 
determine the earnings, a random number was drawn from the specified interval. If the 
subject stated a price higher than the drawn number, she would play the lottery. 
Otherwise she would sell the lottery and receive an amount equal to the drawn number.  
1.3 Implementation of the Experiment 
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zürich. Sixty undergraduates (35 
male and 25 female) from a variety of majors participated in the experiment. The 
average age was 22. There were two sessions with 30 subjects in each session. At the 
beginning of the experiment, subjects received a copy of the instructions (a translation 
can be found in the Appendix). Instructions included screenshots for the different tasks. 
Additionally, the experimenter read aloud the instructions. The experiment lasted about 
45 minutes (plus 30 minutes to explain the instructions). The experiment was 
programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Each subject faced lotteries L1-L15 in a standard and a restricted BDM-task. 
These decision problems were presented to subjects in random order intermixed with 42 
other decision problems that will be analyzed elsewhere. There was no time restriction 
for decision problems and each subject could continue the experiment at her own pace. 
We used a random lottery incentive scheme and physical randomization devices. 
At the end of the experiment each subject drew a card from a box with cards numbered 
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from 1 to 72 (total number of decision problems). The number on the card determined 
the decision problem which was used to compute the payoff of the subject. If the subject 
had to play a risky lottery, she had to draw a second card from a box with a specified 
distribution of red and black cards (we used standard playing cards). Subjects drew the 
second card outside the main laboratory to preserve the anonymity of payments. 
Subjects received a 10 CHF show-up fee and whatever they earned in the 
experiment. Average earnings were 43.9 CHF (approx. $36 or €27). The lowest earning 
was 10 CHF, the highest was 133.8 CHF. At the end of the experiment, the subjects 
were asked to complete a short socio-demographic questionnaire. 
1.4 Results 
We begin with the overall consistency of subjects’ responses. The restricted and 
standard BDM-tasks are equivalent for lotteries that involve 50%-50% chances. 
Therefore, we use lotteries L9 and L15 to check the individual consistency of responses. 
Subjects with deterministic preferences (that are not affected by noise) should state 
identical minimum selling prices for lotteries L9 and L15 in the standard and restricted 
BDM-task. Only 10 subjects (16.7%) showed such consistency for both lotteries.  
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the differences between elicited minimum 
selling prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks for lotteries L9 and L15 across 
subjects. The between-subject consistency rate is 40.8%. We are not aware of any 
studies that report consistency rates for minimum selling prices. However, we find that 
our consistency rate for minimum selling prices is significantly lower than consistency 
rates reported in the literature for binary choice tasks. For example, Hey and Orme 
(1994) and Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report that only 25% and 20.8% of decisions in 
binary choice tasks are reversed if subjects face the same decision problem for a second 
time. 
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Figure 2 Difference between minimum selling prices elicited in identical tasks 
We now investigate if the restrictions on feasible prices in a BDM-task have any 
effect on the elicited prices. We exclude lotteries L9 and L15 from the current analysis 
because standard and restricted BDM-tasks are identical for these two lotteries. 
Most experimental studies assume that subjects ignore compound lotteries in 
pricing tasks. Hence as benchmark, consider subjects who ignore compound lotteries. In 
this case, the fraction of subjects whose minimum selling price for a lottery is outside 
the interval of feasible prices in the restricted BDM-task is the same as in the 
corresponding standard BDM-task. Hence the fraction who state a price equal to the 
bound in the restricted BDM-task is the same as the fraction who state a price outside 
the interval of feasible prices or equal to the bound in the standard BDM-task.  
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 Sum
Standard BDM 35 1 8 21 10 8 16 22 21 22 17 2 14 197
Restricted BDM 12 1 8 9 2 4 2 10 7 7 18 0 4 84
Table 2 Number of subjects who state a price outside or equal to the bound of the 
interval of feasible prices 
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Table 2 summarizes the results of the experiment. For all lotteries, except L12, the 
number of subjects, who state a price in the standard BDM-task that lies outside or on 
the bounds of the feasible interval (2nd row in Table 2), is higher than the number of 
subjects, who state a price in the restricted BDM-task that is equal to the bound of the 
feasible interval (3rd row in Table 2). If subjects used the same method to price lotteries 
in the standard and the restricted BDM-task, then the numbers in the second and third 
row of Table 2 would be the same. Hence, Table 2 suggests that prices elicited through 
a restricted BDM-task are qualitatively different from those elicited in a standard BDM-
task. 
Figure 3 shows for each subject the prices in the standard and the restricted BDM-
task for lottery L1. In the restricted BDM-task, subjects can state only prices in the 
interval [ ]14,0 . Suppose that subjects ignore compound lotteries. If subjects have 
deterministic preferences, then all elicited price combinations would lie on the solid 
line. In other words, if the subject states a price in the standard BDM-task that lies in the 
interval [ ]14,0 , then she states the same price in the restricted BDM-task. If the price in 
the standard BDM-task is not in the interval [ ]14,0 , then the price in the restricted 
BDM-task is equal to 14. For 26 out of 60 subjects (43%), prices for lottery L1 are 
consistent (i.e., price combinations are located on the solid line in Figure 3).  
If subjects are heterogeneous and have stochastic preferences, then an equal 
percentage of price combinations should lie to the left and to the right of the solid line. 
29 subjects stated a price in the restricted BDM-task that was smaller than the upper 
bound of the interval and stated a higher price in the standard BDM-task. But only 5 
subjects stated a higher price in the restricted BDM-task than in the standard BDM-task. 
We can strongly reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (χ2=9.676 and 
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p=0.0018). This striking asymmetry is also observed for the other lotteries where the 
probability of the highest outcome is less than 0.5.  
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Figure 3 Selling prices stated by each subject for lottery ( )9.0,0;1.0,70 L1  
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Selling Price Elicited in Standard BDM-task (CHF)
Se
lli
ng
 P
ric
e 
El
ic
ite
d 
in
 R
es
tr
ic
te
d 
B
D
M
-ta
sk
 (C
H
F)
4
 2
2
 5
 2
 4
 5
 2
2 3
 
Figure 4 Selling prices stated by each subject for lottery ( )11.0,0;89.0,40 L10  
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The opposite asymmetry is observed for lotteries where the probability of the 
highest outcome is higher than 0.5. For example, Figure 4 shows the prices that subjects 
state in standard and restricted BDM-tasks for lottery L10. In the restricted BDM-task, 
subjects can state only prices in the interval [ ]40,2.31 . For 23 out of 60 subjects (38.3%), 
prices are consistent (i.e., price combinations are located on the solid line in Figure 4). 
30 subjects state a price in the restricted BDM-task that is higher than the lower bound 
and higher than the price elicited in the standard BDM-task. But only 7 subjects state a 
higher price in the standard BDM-task. Again, we can strongly reject the null hypo-
thesis of equal proportions (χ2=7.913 and p=0.0049). We observe a similar asymmetry 
for the other lotteries where the probability of the highest outcome is higher than 0.5.  
Our results show that subjects tend to state a higher (lower) price in the restricted 
BDM-task than in the standard BDM-task if the probability of the highest outcome is 
higher (lower) than 0.5. Thus, there is a systematic discrepancy between the prices that 
are elicited in restricted and standard BDM-tasks. 
1.5 Aversion to State Bounds, the Certainty Effect, and 
Framing Effects 
Before we analyze the predictions of different decision theories, we briefly discuss 
three possible explanations for the experimental results: 
1) subjects are averse to state bounds 
2) the certainty effect 
3) framing effects. 
1) Aversion to state bounds refers to the observation that subjects are reluctant to 
take actions which are extreme relative to the set of feasible actions and instead take 
some action which is slightly less extreme. In the context of BDM-tasks, this implies 
that subjects might be reluctant to state one of the bounds of the interval of feasible 
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prices (even if the bound is their preferred price). Therefore, they state a price close to 
(but not equal to) the bound. In the standard BDM-task, the bounds of the interval of 
feasible prices are equal to the lowest and highest outcome of the lottery. In the 
restricted BDM-task, the interval of feasible prices is symmetric around the expected 
value and one of the bounds is equal to the lowest or highest outcome of the lottery 
(whichever is closer to the expected value). To analyze whether aversion to state bounds 
can explain the experimental results, we consider the bound that differs between the 
standard and restricted BDM-tasks. 
To formalize the idea that subjects are reluctant to state a price equal to the 
bound and state instead a price close to the bound, we consider prices that differ from 
the bound by at most 10% of the length of the interval of feasible prices in the restricted 
BDM-task. Row 2 in Table 3 contains the number of prices elicited in standard BDM-
tasks that lie outside the interval or differ from the bound by at most 10% of the length 
of the interval. Row 3 in Table 3 contains the number of prices elicited in restricted 
BDM-tasks that differ from the bound by at most 10% of the length of the interval.  
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 Sum
Standard BDM 35 3 8 22 12 10 16 22 24 24 17 10 21 224
Restricted BDM 13 2 8 11 4 7 8 13 11 13 18 7 13 128
Table 3 Number of subjects who state a price outside the interval of feasible prices 
or within 10% of the relevant bound 
 
Table 3 shows the same discrepancy between the elicited prices as Table 2 does, 
although the differences between row 2 and 3 are smaller (as one would expect since in 
the standard BDM-task fewer prices lie in the interval than in the restricted BDM-task). 
Hence, if aversion to state bounds plays a role at all, it can only explain a small part of 
the discrepancy between the elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. 
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2) The certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) refers to the observation 
that individuals seem to overweight outcomes that are certain, relative to outcomes that 
are merely probable. In the context of our experiment, two prices result in certain 
outcomes. If the subject states a price equal to the lower bound of the interval of 
feasible prices, she sells the lottery for sure. If she states a price equal to the upper 
bound, she plays the lottery for sure. In the restricted BDM-task, one of the bounds 
differs from the bounds in the standard BDM-task. According to the certainty effect, the 
percentage of prices in the restricted BDM-task that are equal to this bound should be 
larger than the percentage of prices that are equal to the bound or outside the feasible 
interval in the standard BDM-task. Inspection of Table 2 shows immediately that this is 
not the case. 
Of course, this does not imply that aversion to state bounds or the certainty effect 
do not affect the prices that subjects state in this experiment. However, aversion to state 
bounds and the certainty effect can neither alone nor in combination explain the 
discrepancy between the elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. 
3) The term ‘framing effect’ refers to the observation that individuals often 
respond differently to different descriptions of the same task. The description of the 
standard and the restricted BDM-tasks differs. But in general, standard and the restricted 
BDM-tasks are different tasks since the method to determine payoffs differ (i.e., the 
interval from which the random number is drawn) and since the range of feasible prices 
differ. To analyze whether the observed discrepancies between the elicited prices can be 
explained by the different description of the tasks we consider lotteries L9 and L15 
because the standard and restricted BDM-tasks are the same for these lotteries. Lotteries 
L9 and L15 involve a 50% chance of receiving the high outcome. Hence the range of 
feasible prices and the interval from which the random number is drawn that determines 
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the payoff coincide in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. For lotteries L9 and L15, the 
only difference between the standard and restricted BDM-tasks is in the description of 
the two tasks. 
Table 4 describes the results for lotteries L9 and L15. We run a paired sample t-
test with the null-hypothesis that means are equal and a sign-test with the null-
hypothesis that it is equally likely that the price in the standard and the restricted BDM-
task is larger. 
Lottery L9 Lottery L15 
 
Standard 
BDM-task 
Restricted 
BDM-task 
Standard 
BDM-task 
Restricted 
BDM-task 
Mean stated price 34.36 35.69 27.49 27.38 
Median stated price 32.5 32.5 25 25 
t-statistic (p-value) -1.045  (0.30) 0.095  (0.925) 
p-value of Signtest  0.8714 1 
Table 4 Test of framing effects 
 Table 4 shows that there is no significant framing effect for lotteries L9 and L15. 
Thus, even if framing effects occur in our experiment, they do not have a significant 
effect on stated prices. 
In the next section, we analyze expected utility theory (EUT) as benchmark and 
show that EUT cannot explain the data. Then we discuss two possible explanations of 
the results: 
- Compound lotteries. Since the random number that determines payoffs is 
drawn from different intervals, compound lotteries differ even if subject state 
the same price (section 2.2). 
- Range effects from the stochastic pricing of lotteries (section 2.3). 
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2 Theoretical Predictions 
2.1 Expected Utility Theory 
According to EUT, the utility of a lottery ( )111 1 ,0 ;, ppxL −  is ( )11 xup , where 
RR →:u  is a non-decreasing Bernoulli utility function that is normalized so that 
( ) 00 =u . The certainty equivalent LCE  of L is implicitly defined by ( ) ( )11 xupCEu L = .  
Consider a standard BDM-task. A subject who states a minimum selling price 
[ ]1,0 xx∈  for lottery L faces a compound lottery that yields the simple lottery L with 
probability 1xx (i.e., when the number that is drawn at random from the interval [ ]1,0 x  
is smaller or equal to x). Additionally, the compound lottery yields every outcome in the 
interval [ ]1, xx  with equal probability. A subject, who states a minimum selling price x, 
obtains utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dyyuxxupxxxU x
xS ∫+= 1  1 1111 . The price Sx  that maximizes 
SU  is the solution to ( ) 0=dxxdUS . Hence ( ) ( )11 xupxu S = . Thus, LS CEx =  and 
expected utility maximizers reveal their certainty equivalent in a standard BDM-task. 
In a restricted BDM-task, subjects can only state prices in the interval [ ]xx, , 
where { }12,0max 11 −= pxx  and { }1,2min 11 pxx =  are the bounds of the interval of 
feasible prices. A subject, who states price x for lottery L, faces a compound lottery that 
yields the simple lottery L with probability ( ) ( )xxxx −− . Additionally, the compound 
lottery yields every outcome in the interval [ ]xx,  with equal probability. If a subject 
states price x, the utility of the compound lottery is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
xx
dyyuxupxx
xU
x
x
R −
+⋅−= ∫11 .  
If there exists [ ]xxxR ,∈  such that ( ) 0=dxxdU RR , then Rx  is the price that 
maximizes RU . Hence ( ) ( )11 xupxu R =  and, therefore, LR CEx = . If there exists no 
[ ]xxxR ,∈  such that ( ) 0=dxxdU RR , then there are two cases. If 211 <p , then x  is 
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equal to the lowest outcome of the lottery and ( ) 0>dxxdU R  for every [ ]xxx ,∈ . 
Hence the price Rx  that maximizes RU  is equal to x . If 211 >p , then x  is equal to the 
highest outcome of the lottery and ( ) 0<dxxdU R  for every [ ]xxx ,∈ . Hence the 
price Rx  that maximizes RU  is equal to x . 
Thus, in a restricted BDM-task expected utility maximizers state a price that is 
equal to their certainty equivalent if the certainty equivalent lies in interval [ ]xx, . 
Otherwise, they state the price 112 px  if 211 <p  and 11 )12( xp −  if 211 >p . 
We are interested to test whether a stochastic version of EUT can explain the 
discrepancy of elicited prices in the restricted and the standard BDM-tasks. We consider 
heterogeneous subjects who have stochastic preferences where each preference relation 
can be described by EUT. To test the predictions of EUT, we compute a sample of 
prices that are predicted by EUT for the restricted BDM-task. To compute the sample of 
predicted prices, we take the prices that are elicited in the standard BDM-task and 
replace prices that lie outside the interval of feasible prices with the respective bound 
and leave the other prices unchanged.  
We compare the elicited and predicted prices for each subject and each lottery. 
Predicted prices are generated by applying the prediction of EUT. It follows 
immediately that according to EUT, for each subject and for each lottery, the probability 
that the predicted price is smaller than the elicited price in the restricted BDM-task is 
equal to the probability that the predicted price is larger than the elicited price. We use a 
sign-test to analyze how predicted and elicited prices differ. For each subject and 
lottery, we compute the difference between the elicited price in the restricted BDM-task 
and the predicted price according to EUT. The null-hypothesis is that the differences are 
drawn from a distribution with median zero.  
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 Lotteries with 211 <p  Lotteries with 211 >p  
Actual price is above predicted 25.8% 39.8% 
Actual price is below predicted 46.7% 19.3% 
p-value for sign test 0.000 0.000 
Table 5 Results of a sign test of the prediction of expected utility theory 
Table 5 summarizes the results. The second and third row of Table 5 show the 
percentage of elicited prices in a restricted BDM-task that are higher and lower than the 
predicted price. The sign-test shows that we can reject the null-hypothesis that it is 
equally likely that the price elicited in a restricted BDM-task is smaller respectively 
larger than the predicted price. For lotteries with 211 <p ( 211 >p ), minimum selling 
prices stated in a restricted BDM-task are systematically below (above) predicted prices. 
 Table 5 shows that we can reject EUT as explanation for the discrepancy 
between elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. Furthermore, we can also 
reject any other decision theory that predicts the same consistency of selling prices in 
standard and restricted BDM-tasks.  
2.2 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (RDEU) and 
Cumulative Prospect Theory 
If preferences do not satisfy the independence axiom and subjects take 
compound lotteries into account, then optimal prices in standard and restricted BDM-
tasks can differ systematically. In this section, we investigate the predictions of one 
popular generalization of expected utility theory that does not assume independence — 
the rank-dependent expected utility model (RDEU) proposed by Quiggin (1981). The 
predictions of RDEU coincide with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) when all lottery outcomes are above or equal to the 
reference point.  
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According to RDEU, the utility of lottery ( )111 1 ,0 ;, ppxL −  is ( ) ( )11 xupw ⋅ , where 
[ ] [ ]1,01,0: →w  is a non-decreasing probability weighting function that satisfies ( ) 00 =w  
and ( ) 11 =w . The certainty equivalent LCE  is implicitly defined by ( ) ( ) ( )11 xupwCEu L ⋅= .  
An individual who states a minimum selling price x in a standard BDM-task 
obtains utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dyyuxxpxywxuxxpwxU x
x
RDEU
S ∫ ⋅+−′+⋅= 1  111111  1 . The 
minimum selling price Sx  which maximizes 
RDEU
SU  is the solution to 
( ) 0=dxxdU RDEUS . An individual who states a minimum selling price x in a restricted 
BDM-task obtains utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dyyu
xx
xxpyx
wxup
xx
xxwxU
x
x
RDEU
R ∫ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−′+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=  
 
1
11 . 
Let [ ]xxxR ,∈  be the price that maximizes RDEURU .  
We estimated the parameters of RDEU separately for each subject using utility 
function u(x) = xα and probability weighting function w(p) = pγ/( pγ + (1-p)γ)1/γ. The 
coefficients α and γ are estimated to minimize the weighted sum of squared errors 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]215
1 1
215
1 1 ∑∑ == −+−= i iiRiRi iiSiS xDxxDxSSE , where iSD  and iRD  are the prices 
that a subject stated for lottery i in a standard and restricted BDM-tasks and iSx  and 
i
Rx  
are the corresponding predictions of RDEU. Non-linear unconstrained optimization was 
implemented in the Matlab 7.2 package (based on the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm). 
Figure 5 shows the scatterplot of the estimated parameters of RDEU for all 60 
subjects. Median estimated parameters are α = 1.10 and γ = 0.94. 42 out of 60 subjects 
(70%) have a typical inverse S-shaped weighting function (γ <1) and 22 out of 60 
subjects (37%) have a typical concave utility function (α <1). For 12 subjects (20%) the 
estimated coefficients are in the range of typical parameterizations of RDEU i.e. 0< α <1 
(concave utility function) and 0< γ <1 (inverse S-shaped weighting function). This range 
of typical parameterizations is shown as shaded area in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 Scatterplot of the estimated parameters of RDEU (N=60) if subjects take 
compound lotteries into account 
Figure 7—Figure 10 in the Appendix show selling prices stated by subjects in 
both BDM-tasks (horizontal axis) and the corresponding prices xS and xR predicted by 
RDEU (vertical axis) with the estimated best-fitting parameters α and γ. Prices are 
measured relative to the highest outcome of the lottery so that 100% denotes a price 
equal to lottery outcome x1. Points located on the solid 45° line represent a perfect fit of 
the theory to the data. The farther away a point is from the 45° line, the worse is the fit. 
Figure 7—Figure 10 also include the estimated best-fitting parameters α and γ for every 
subject and the weighted sum of squared errors (SSE) for the RDEU prediction. 
Figure 7—Figure 10 show that RDEU provides a remarkably good fit for selling 
prices for nearly all subjects. Thus, if we assume that subjects take compound lotteries 
into account, RDEU gives a very accurate description of the selling prices that are 
elicited in both BDM-tasks. If we assume that subjects ignore compound lotteries, 
RDEU predicts the same consistency across standard and restricted BDM-tasks as 
expected utility theory does. We already established in the previous subsection that this 
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prediction is soundly rejected. Thus, to explain the results of the experiment while 
maintaining the RDEU paradigm, one needs to assume that subjects take compound 
lotteries into account.  
2.3 A Model of Stochastic Pricing 
In this section, we propose an alternative explanation for the discrepancy of 
prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. We analyze a model of stochastic pricing 
where individuals compare the lottery to different monetary amounts to determine the 
minimum selling price. This model offers a behavioral foundation of range effects. 
In Section 1.4, we have shown that both within and between-subject consistency 
rates of elicited selling prices for identical lotteries are quite low. To account for low 
consistency rates, we consider individuals with stochastic preferences. Each individual 
is characterized by a set Π of rational preference relations on the space of lotteries and a 
probability measure η on Π. Preferences are described by a pair (η, Π). If an individual 
faces a binary choice problem, she draws a preference relation ≿ρ ∈ Π according to η 
and chooses according to the realized ≿ρ. To determine the minimum selling price of a 
lottery, the individual compares the lottery to different monetary amounts which are 
drawn from the set of possible prices SL. 
In a standard BDM-task, the set of possible prices is the interval between the 
lowest and the highest outcome. Hence, for lottery ( )111 1 ,0 ;, ppxL −  we have 
[ ]1,0 xSL = . Wilcox (1994, p.318) provides evidence that subjects search between the 
highest and the lowest outcome of a lottery to find their minimum selling price in a 
standard BDM-task. In a restricted BDM-task, the set of possible prices is equal to the 
interval of feasible prices. 
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To find the minimum selling price of lottery L, individuals first draw an amount 
LSx∈  at random. In the second step, they draw a preference relation ≿ρ ∈ Π  
according to probability measure η and compare x to the lottery L. If x ~ρ L then x is 
stated as the minimum selling price of L. If x ≻ρ L, then step 2 is repeated with x being 
replaced by max{x-Δ, min SL}, where Δ>0 is the step size by which the amount is 
adjusted. If L ≻ρ x, then step 2 is repeated with x being replaced by min{x+Δ, max SL}. 
Note that individuals draw a new preference relation each time when they compare a 
lottery to a monetary amount. The sequence of binary comparisons ends if the preferred 
alternative switches. In this case, the minimum selling price is the average of the last 
two amounts to which the lottery has been compared. 
For example, consider an individual who prices the lottery L(70, 0.1; 0, 0.9). The 
set of possible prices is [0,70]. Suppose that the individual starts the sequence of binary 
comparisons with 20=x  and the step size is Δ=5. If x ≻ L, she then compares the 
lottery with 15=x . If she still prefers x, in the next step she compares the lottery with 
10=x . If she now prefers the lottery over 10=x , she states a minimum selling of 12.5.  
The stochastic pricing model describes the determination of the minimum 
selling price as a grid search where the lottery is compared to different monetary 
amounts. If individuals use such a simple grid search, then the price that an individual 
states in a standard and restricted BDM-task can be described as random variable whose 
distribution depends on the probability measure η over preference relations, on the step-
size Δ, and the set of possible prices SL. Consider the simplest possible case of a two 
outcome lottery L(x1, p1; 0, 11 p− ) when individuals are “on average” risk neutral, i.e. 
they are just as likely to choose amount δ−11xp  over lottery L as they are likely to 
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choose L over amount δ+11xp . In this case, the median selling price in a restricted 
BDM-task is just the expected value 11xp  of the lottery. However, the median selling 
price in a standard BDM-task is higher (lower) than the expected value of the lottery for 
lotteries with 211 <p  ( 211 >p ), at least if preferences are sufficiently random relative 
to the step size Δ.  
Intuitively, if 211 <p , then an individual is more likely to start the grid search 
in a standard BDM-task with an amount x that is higher than the expected value of the 
lottery. If preferences are sufficiently stochastic relative to the step size Δ, this 
individual is then also more likely to end the grid search at an amount higher than the 
expected value of the lottery. The reverse holds for lotteries with 211 >p . Thus, a 
simple model of stochastic pricing explains both the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes 
and the systematic discrepancies between elicited prices in standard and restricted 
BDM-tasks that we observed in our experiment. 
For example, Figure 6 shows the median certainty equivalent and a Monte Carlo 
simulation of the median selling prices for lottery L(70, p1; 0, 11 p− ) when probability 
1p  is varied between 0 and 1. We assume that every preference relation is represented 
by a constant relative risk aversion utility function ( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11 . We assume that 
the coefficient r is normally distributed with mean 0.2 and standard deviation 0.4. The 
price for the lottery is determined by a simple grid search with the step size Δ = 1 CHF. 
For each value of probability 1p  we conducted 10
4 simulations of prices in standard and 
restricted BDM-tasks. The median values of the simulated prices are shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 shows that median prices in a standard BDM-task are systematically 
higher (lower) than median prices in a restricted BDM-task for lotteries with 211 <p  
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( 211 >p ). The reason for the different prices is not that subjects face different 
compound lotteries in the two tasks. Instead, the reason is that the monetary amounts 
that are compared to the lottery are drawn from different intervals. Additionally, our 
model of stochastic lottery pricing explains the risk-seeking (risk-averse) decisions in 
standard BDM-pricing tasks for lotteries with a low (high) probability of a gain 
although preferences in this example are captured by a random expected utility model. 
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Figure 6 Monte Carlo simulation of median prices for lottery ( )11 1,0;,70 ppL −  
when preferences are represented by the random utility function ( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11 , 
( )4.0,2.0~ Nr  and prices are determined by a grid search with step size Δ = 1 CHF 
We estimate the proposed model of stochastic pricing on our experimental data. 
We assume that the preferences of every subject are represented by a constant relative 
risk aversion utility function ( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11  with coefficient r being normally 
distributed with mean μ and standard deviation σ. Note that in this case, the probability 
that a subject chooses lottery ( )111 1,0;, ppxL −  over amount [ ]1,0 xx∈  for sure is  
(1) { } ( ) ( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
∈+Φ
=
=
1
11,
,0
,0,log1
0,1
Pr
1
xx
xxp
x
xL xxσμf  
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where ( ).,σμΦ  denotes the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution with 
mean μ and standard deviation σ. The probability that a subject chooses amount x over 
lottery L is ( ) ( )xLLx ff Pr1Pr −= , where ( )xL fPr  is defined in equation (1). 
If a subject starts the sequence of hypothetical binary comparisons from amount 
x, then the likelihood that this subject reveals selling price z is approximated by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )⎩⎨
⎧
≥Δ+−⋅Δ−××
<Δ++⋅Δ+××=
zxmxLLmxLx
zxLxkxkxLxL
zx
,0,1maxPrPr...Pr
,,1minPrPr...Pr
,rP~ 1fff
fff
 
where { },...1,0∈k  is the highest number such that zkx <Δ+ , { },...1,0∈m  is the highest 
number such that zmx ≥Δ−  and Δ is the step size of the grid search. For every subject, 
random utility parameters μ and σ are estimated to maximize the total log-likelihood 
( )( )
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where the step size Δ is taken to be 10% of the interval of feasible prices i.e. 101x=Δ  
in the standard BDM-task and ( ) 10xx −=Δ  in the restricted BDM-task. Across all 60 
subjects, median estimated parameters turned out to be 86.0−=μ  and 46.1=σ . 
To compare the fit of the stochastic pricing model with that of RDEU, we run a 
Monte Carlo simulation where we use the estimated parameters of the stochastic pricing 
model to generate minimum selling prices. Figure 11—Figure 14 show the prices that 
subjects state in the BDM-tasks (horizontal axis) and the corresponding mean prices 
according to the stochastic pricing model (vertical axis). For each subject and each 
decision we run 104 simulations with the estimated random utility parameters μ and σ 
and the step size Δ=10%. The mean of 104 simulated prices is shown on the vertical axis 
of Figure 11—Figure 14. Both stated prices and simulated mean prices are measured 
relative to the highest outcome of a lottery so that 100% denotes a price equal to lottery 
 26
outcome x1. Figure 11—Figure 14 also include the estimated parameters μ and σ and the 
sum of squared errors (SSE). 
Figure 11—Figure 14 show that for nearly all subjects, simulated mean prices 
are remarkably close to the elicited prices. Thus, the model of stochastic pricing is a 
promising alternative to describe decisions in BDM-tasks. Simulated mean prices are 
also close to the prices predicted by RDEU. For 28 out of 60 subjects (46.7%), the 
correlation coefficient between simulated mean prices from the stochastic pricing model 
and prices predicted by RDEU is higher than 0.95, which indicates that two models 
make nearly identical predictions.  
The fit of the stochastic pricing model is similar to that of RDEU. If we compare 
SSE for the stochastic pricing model with SSE for the RDEU prediction, 29 out of 60 
subjects (48.3%) have a lower SSE for the stochastic pricing model. However, the 
difference between the SSE is small. For 18 subjects, the difference of the SSE of the 
two models is less than 5%. Among the remaining subjects, 20 (22) subjects have a 
lower SSE for the stochastic pricing model (for RDEU). Thus, the stochastic pricing 
model explains the experimental results about as well as RDEU, when RDEU takes 
compound lotteries into account.  
2.4 Out-of-sample Prediction 
Both RDEU and the stochastic pricing model achieve a similar goodness of fit 
when they are estimated on the complete data set (prices stated in standard and 
restricted BDM-tasks). However, as economists, we are ultimately interested in how 
good models predict decisions. Therefore, we also compare the two models by the 
quality of their out-of sample predictions. For every subject, we estimate the parameters 
of both models using only the elicited prices from the standard BDM-task. Then we use 
the estimated parameters to predict the minimum selling price that this subject states in 
the restricted BDM-task. Note that we can not estimate parameters using only prices 
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from the restricted BDM-task. If subjects state the bound in the restricted BDM-task, 
then parameters can not be determined if we do not have information about the price 
that they state in the standard BDM-task. 
We estimate RDEU separately for each subject using the elicited prices from the 
standard BDM-task and utility function u(x) = xα and probability weighting function 
w(p) = pγ/( pγ + (1-p)γ)1/γ. The coefficients α and γ are estimated to minimize the 
weighted sum of squared errors ( )[ ]215
1 1∑ = −= i iiSiS xDxSSE , where iSD  is the price that 
a subject stated for lottery i in a standard BDM-task and iSx  is the corresponding 
prediction of RDEU (as described in section 2.2). Given the estimated parameters αˆ  
and γˆ  we compute the predicted selling price for lottery i in a restricted BDM-task 
( )γα ˆ,ˆiRx  as described in section 2.2. Given these predicted prices we compute the sum 
of squared errors for the RDEU prediction, i.e., ( )( )[ ]215
1 1
ˆ,ˆ∑= −= i iiRiR xDxSSE γα . 
We estimate the proposed model of stochastic pricing separately for each subject 
using the elicited prices from the standard BDM-task and utility function 
( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11  where coefficient r is normally distributed with mean μ and standard 
deviation σ. For every subject, random utility parameters μ and σ are estimated to 
maximize log-likelihood ( )( )∑ ∑= +Δ= ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Δ+Δ=
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LL  where the step 
size Δ is 10% of the interval of feasible prices and ( )( )iSDj ,1rP~ −Δ  is defined as in 
section 2.3. For each subject and each lottery we then run 104 simulations of prices 
stated in the restricted BDM-task given the estimated random utility parameters μˆ  and 
σˆ  and the step size Δ=10%. Taking the mean values ( )σμ ˆ,ˆiRx  of these 104 Monte Carlo 
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simulations, we compute the sum of squared errors for the model of stochastic pricing, 
i.e., ( )( )[ ]215
1 1
ˆ,ˆ∑= −= i iiRiR xDxSSE σμ . 
A comparison of the sum of squared errors for predicted prices in restricted 
BDM-tasks clearly shows that the stochastic pricing model predicts prices more 
accurately. For 39 out of 60 subjects (65%) the model of stochastic pricing has a lower 
sum of squared errors than RDEU. For 26 subjects (43%) the sum of squared errors of 
the stochastic pricing model is at least 20% smaller than the sum of squared errors of 
the RDEU prediction. But only for 8 subjects (13%) the sum of squared errors of the 
RDEU prediction is at least 20% smaller than the sum of squared errors of the 
prediction of the stochastic pricing model. Therefore, the model of stochastic pricing 
appears to have a better out-of-sample forecasting power than RDEU.  
3 Conclusion 
We study lottery pricing under the BDM procedure. We compare prices that are 
elicited in standard BDM-tasks with those elicited in restricted BDM-tasks. The two 
tasks differ in one important aspect. In a standard BDM-task, subjects can state prices 
between the highest and the lowest outcome of the lottery. In a restricted BDM-task, 
subjects can state prices that lie within a smaller interval that is symmetric around the 
expected value of the lottery. The interval imposes a lower (upper) bound on prices for 
lotteries when the probability p of a gain is higher (lower) than 0.5. We observe strong 
range effects—a highly significant discrepancy between the prices for the same lottery 
in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. Subjects state systematically higher (lower) 
prices in the restricted BDM-task for lotteries with 5.0>p  ( )5.0<p .  
We propose a stochastic pricing model that explains these range effects. We 
consider individuals with stochastic preferences who determine the minimum selling 
price via a sequence of comparisons between the lottery and different monetary 
 29
amounts. We find that consistency rates in repeated pricing of a lottery are quite low, 
which suggests that a model of stochastic preferences is indeed appropriate. This model 
offers a simple explanation for the observed discrepancy between lottery prices in the 
standard and the restricted BDM-tasks. Additionally, the model generates systematic 
overbidding (underbidding) in standard BDM-tasks for lotteries with a low (high) 
probability of receiving the highest outcome (the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes). 
When estimated on the whole data set, the stochastic pricing model achieves a 
similar goodness of fit as RDEU when subjects in RDEU take compound lotteries into 
account. We also use the elicited prices in the standard BDM-task to estimate both 
models and to predict prices in the restricted BDM-task. We find that our stochastic 
pricing model gives more accurate out-of-sample predictions. 
Our results have several implications for future research. It appears that prices 
elicited in standard BDM-tasks are systematically too high (low) if the chance of a gain 
is low (high). This supports recent findings of Bateman et al. (2007), who argue that 
some empirical anomalies such as the preference reversal phenomenon may be an 
artefact of the BDM-task and that their frequency is significantly reduced if lottery 
prices are elicited through different techniques. 
The proposed model of stochastic pricing provides a behavioral foundation for 
range effects that are frequently observed in experiments. The discrepancy between 
prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks can be interpreted as the result of range 
effects. The stochastic pricing model provides a simple and intuitive explanation for 
why we observe a range effect. The range effect occurs because the restriction on the 
interval of feasible prices affects the set of feasible prices that may be compared to the 
lottery in a sequence of binary comparisons.  
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Appendix 
Translation of the instructions for the experiment. Text in italics did not appear in 
the instructions. 
 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making. The money to conduct this experiment has 
been provided by a research grant. We will ask you to answer 72 questions. 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will compute how much money you receive. 
Your payoff depends only on your decisions and on chance events. Your payoff does 
not depend on decisions of other participants. 
 
The experiment uses different lotteries. If you play a lottery, you receive a certain 
amount of money with some probability. With the remaining probability, you receive 
nothing. All lotteries have the following structure: 
 
 A box contains 100 cards. 
 28 cards are red. 
 72 cards are black. 
 If a red card is drawn, you earn 110 Swiss Francs. 
 If a black card is drawn, you earn nothing. 
 
 
At the end of the experiment appears a message on your screen that asks you to raise 
your hand to inform the experimenters that you have answered all questions. One of the 
experimenters will come by and ask you to complete a short questionnaire. 
Additionally, you will draw a number that determines which question is used to 
compute your payoff. Depending on how you answered this question, you will either 
receive a fixed amount or you will play a lottery. The actual payout happens in the room 
in front of the computer lab. If you play a lottery, you will be asked there to draw a card 
from the corresponding box. The color of the card determines whether you have won in 
the lottery. 
 
There is no such thing as a right or wrong answer.  
 
There are 5 different types of questions. We use colors to distinguish the different types 
of questions. Colors have no meaning except to distinguish the different types of 
questions. 
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Lilac    (standard BDM-mechanism) 
 
In a lilac question you own the right to play a lottery and receive the outcome. However, 
you can sell the lottery. We will ask you for the minimum price at which you are willing 
to sell the right to play the lottery.  
 
On the computer screen, a lilac question looks like this: 
 
   Left-hand side of Figure 1 appears here 
 
If a lilac question is drawn to determine your payoff, we will additionally draw a 
random amount between zero and the highest outcome of the lottery. If your price is 
higher than the amount that we have drawn, you will keep the lottery and your payoff is 
determined when you play the lottery. If your price is lower or equal to the amount that 
we have drawn, you will sell the lottery and receive the amount that we have drawn. 
 
Question: Is it indeed optimal for you to state truthfully the minimum price at 
which you are willing to sell the lottery? 
 
Answer: Yes 
 
Why? 
The price that you enter has no effect on the amount that you receive if you sell the 
lottery. Your price only determines in which cases you sell the lottery. It is optimal for 
you to sell the lottery if you receive at least as much as the lottery is worth to you. 
Hence it is optimal for you to enter the minimum price at which you are willing to sell 
the lottery. 
 
Example: 
Suppose that you are indifferent whether you play the lottery or receive 20 Swiss 
Francs. If you enter a price below 20 Francs (e.g., 15 Francs), it is possible that you sell 
the lottery for less than 20 Francs (e.g., 17 Francs). But since the lottery is worth 20 
Francs to you, you would have been better off if you would have entered a higher price 
and would have kept the lottery. 
If you enter a price above 20 Francs (e.g., 25 Francs), it is possible that an amount 
between 20 and 25 Francs is randomly drawn (e.g., 23 Francs). In this case, you would 
keep the lottery. But since the lottery is worth 20 Francs to you, you would have been 
better off if you would have entered a lower price and would have sold the lottery. 
 
Hence: It is optimal for you to enter the minimum price at which you are willing to 
sell the lottery. 
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Green  (restricted BDM-mechanism) 
 
In a green question, you own the right to play a lottery and receive the outcome. 
However, you can sell the lottery. We will ask you for the minimum price for which 
you are willing to sell the right to play the lottery.  
The difference between the lilac and the green questions is that in green questions, 
you can only enter prices from some specified interval. 
 
On the computer screen, a green question looks like this: 
 
    Right-hand side of Figure 1 appears here 
 
In this example, you can only state prices between 42 and 70. 
 
If a green question is drawn to determine your payoff, we will additionally draw a 
random amount from the interval of feasible prices that is specified by the interval. If 
your price is higher than the amount that we have drawn, you will keep the lottery and 
your payoff is determined when you play the lottery. If your price is lower or equal to 
the amount that we have drawn, you will sell the lottery and receive the amount that we 
have drawn. 
 
Question: Is it indeed optimal for you to state truthfully the minimum price at 
which you are willing to sell the lottery? 
 
Answer: You can only enter prices in the interval. If the minimum price at which you 
are willing to sell the lottery is in the interval, then the situation is the same as in the 
lilac questions. Hence it is optimal for you to state the minimum price at which you are 
willing to sell the lottery. 
 
If the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the lottery is higher than the upper 
bound of the interval, then it is optimal for you to enter the upper bound as price for the 
lottery. 
 
Why? 
If the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the lottery is higher than the upper 
bound of the interval, then the random amount that is drawn from the interval is always 
smaller than your minimum price. Hence it is optimal for you not to sell the lottery.  
  
 
If the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the lottery is smaller than the 
lower bound of the interval, then it is optimal to enter the lower bound as price for the 
lottery. 
 
Why? 
If the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the lottery is smaller than the 
lower bound of the interval, then the random amount that is drawn from the interval is 
always higher than your minimum price. Hence it is optimal for you to sell the lottery. 
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Subject 5 (α=1.1867, γ=0.8484, SSE=0.3617)
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Subject 13 (α=1.0560, γ=0.9346, SSE=0.3127)
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Figure 7 Selling prices stated by subjects 1-16 and the corresponding prediction according to RDEU (% of the highest outcome of the lottery) 
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Subject 17 (α=2.0602, γ=0.7354, SSE=0.7923)
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Subject 21 (α=0.8717, γ=1.0016, SSE=0.4203)
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Subject 25 (α=0.9115, γ=0.8220, SSE=0.2123)
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Subject 29 (α=0.3720, γ=1.0951, SSE=0.5782)
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Figure 8 Selling prices stated by subjects 17-32 and the corresponding prediction according to RDEU (% of the highest outcome of the lottery) 
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Subject 33 (α=0.9881, γ=1.1880, SSE=0.5607)
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Figure 9 Selling prices stated by subjects 33-48 and the corresponding prediction according to RDEU (% of the highest outcome of the lottery) 
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Subject 49 (α=2.0010, γ=0.7104, SSE=0.2925)
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Figure 10 Selling prices stated by subjects 49-60 and the corresponding prediction according to RDEU (% of the highest outcome of the lottery) 
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Figure 11 Selling prices stated by subjects 1-16 and corresponding mean selling prices according to a model of stochastic pricing  
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Figure 12 Selling prices stated by subjects 17-32 and corresponding mean selling prices according to a model of stochastic pricing 
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Subject 33 (μ=-0.2518, σ=1.0335, SSE=0.7080)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 34 (μ=0.0549, σ=0.1893, SSE=0.0208)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 35 (μ=-3.4315, σ=2.7202, SSE=0.2768)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 36 (μ=-0.7406, σ=1.2959, SSE=0.3798)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 37 (μ=-0.5846, σ=0.6594, SSE=0.2430)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 38 (μ=0.5874, σ=0.2910, SSE=1.3950)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 39 (μ=-0.8972, σ=1.2478, SSE=0.1794)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 40 (μ=-0.1022, σ=1.2296, SSE=0.3727)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 41 (μ=-3.0556, σ=2.3947, SSE=1.1918)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 42 (μ=-2.8444, σ=2.1270, SSE=0.4061)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 43 (μ=0.1675, σ=0.6500, SSE=0.1235)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 44 (μ=0.2004, σ=0.7243, SSE=3.6374)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 45 (μ=0.6279, σ=0.6670, SSE=1.3469)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 46 (μ=-0.7665, σ=0.7143, SSE=0.2140)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 47 (μ=0.0783, σ=0.1676, SSE=0.0097)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
Subject 48 (μ=-0.1222, σ=0.2828, SSE=0.2884)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stated Selling Price
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
S
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
Standard BDM
Restricted BDM
c
 
Figure 13 Selling prices stated by subjects 33-48 and corresponding mean selling prices according to a model of stochastic pricing 
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Subject 49 (μ=-1.1830, σ=1.4136, SSE=0.2565)
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Figure 14 Selling prices stated by subjects 49-60 and corresponding mean selling prices according to a model of stochastic pricing 
 
